The first thing worth saying is just how monumental the decision
to go to war with each other truly is to both Iran
and Israel .
The price both might pay, along with the rest of the region,
is something they have both contemplated for years.
frankly, the fear of where such a conflict might leave both
of the parties has been the best deterrence.
I've commented before Mutual Assured Destruction is not a strategic
concept that Israel
would base their survival on, yet their undeclared nuclear weapons program has
in fact provided them with this option for years.
To paraphrase several past Israeli Statesmen and Women, '
Most of Israel was sand when they fought for it and most of Israel will be
sand if they lose it.'
For the sake of looking at how this tragic event could take
place, we need to accept the fact that MAD will not prevent the conflict.
How might it happen?
Let's take a look at two baseline scenarios; one with Iran starting the conflict and one with Israel initiating
the event.
One particular lesson that may have been discovered from the 2006 / 2008 " proxy wars" Iran experimented
with is the strategic and tactical value of Israeli Air Force Bases.
the IAF is also the stopgap measure the IDF counts on to buy
itself time for mobilization of it's grown forces.
To lose the IAF fields, even for a minimal amount of time, would
prove to be disastrous for Israel .
An Iranian preemptive
missile strike on IAF airfields would be
a logical strategic concept that would, at least temporarily, level the playing
field.
What Iran
would have to consider and do so very carefully, would be the classical "
Law of Unintended Consequences".
To cripple the IAF as a first strike option would force Israel to
escalate their response dramatically.
The classical, controlled exchange of conflict would not be
an option if the IDF found itself without it's Air Force at the very beginning
of the conflict.
Simply put, Israel
would almost assuredly respond disproportionately knowing how wounded their
defense had become.
If Iran
was truly set on blunting Israel 's
ability to wage near-term warfare, it would have to gamble with the initial
counter attack.
The short answer is, this scenario is an " all in"
option with little room for limited exchanges.
This is the type of action Iran
would take if it truly meant to attempt to defeat Israel in combat; something they
will not achieve.
The Iranian ability to " control" the initial conflict
would probably be based on the more classical " proxy" actions such
as in 2006 and 2008.
Iran's use of Hezbollah and Hamas, although I think Hamas is
no longer an option for Iranian planning purposes, would allow Iran to send the
message, not just to Israel, but to the rest of the world, just how desperate
the events had become.
Again, the Law of Unintended Consequences would come into
play.
How Egypt
and Turkey
and the GCC would respond has changed dramatically after the impact of the Arab
Spring.
Would the rest of the region sit on the sidelines and watch
the two real enemies of the region duke it out?
Would the GCC come to the aid of the Persians?
Would the Muslim Brotherhood really care if Iran was dealt a crippling blow while most
likely dealing one as well to Israel ?
Would the Ottoman Empire
risk conflict for the sake of the Persians?
Yes, the people of Palestine
would suffer as well as the people of Lebanon , but does that equate into
deaths for Egyptians or Turks?
I don't think so.
So, is this a good option for the Iranians?
Probably not and they most likely believe the same.
Ok, if the options for an Iranian first strike are "
Limited... A proxy fight... or a Strategic blow .. the attack on the IAF.. .my
bet is they go strategic.
The problem is, that leads us to a much more serious
conflict than what the world is use to seeing in the Middle
East .
How quickly things can get out of hand and how willing the
rest of the world is to intervene will become the huge issue.
Before I end this discussion on how Iran may react,
I want to make a point that has been talked about for several years now.
Would Iran
truly target non Israeli targets in this conflict?
The short answer is... it depends.
It depends if Iran is convinced they are in a
" use or lose" event... if they feel their current government is
about to suffer the classical " regime change" conflict... then
anything is possible.
But, if Iran
executes a " First Strike" based on warning the world they will not tolerate
further interference in their matters, such as an Arab Spring type events
starting to happen in Iran ,
then they may limit the severity of the message.
Simply put, if they feel their national survival is at
stake... yes they will attack " other targets.... If they are trying to send
a desperate message.. then they will not.. at least not at first.
Tomorrow I will give my opinion of Israeli " First
Strike" Options.